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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the trial court's order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence and finding her guilty 
as charged after a bench trial in Third Judicial Circuit 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) and Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 26(2)(a) (Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1989)). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the State's failure to notify defendant of a 
witness violate defendant's right to discovery? 
2. Did Officer Manning have probable cause to stop 
defendant's vehicle? 
3. Are Utah's motor vehicle provisions constitutional? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Eileen 0. Booth, was charged with failure to 
have a Utah driver's license and failure to have a vehicle 
registration. (R.20-21). After a bench trial, defendant was 
found guilty as charged. (T.45). 
- iii -
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §41-2-104 (1989): 
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under 
Section 41-2-107, 41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or 
Subsection 41-2-121(4), or Chapter 22, Title 41, 
may operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this 
state unless the person is licensed as an operator 
by the division under this chapter. 
(2) No person, except those exempted under Section 
41-2-107, may operate or, while within the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle, exercise any 
degree or form of physical control of a vehicle 
being towed by a motor vehicle upon a highway 
unless the person holds a valid license issued 
under this chapter for the type or class of 
vehicle being towed. 
(3)(a) A person may not operate a motor vehicle as 
a taxicab on a highway or this state unless the 
person has a taxicab endorsement issued by the 
division on his driver license. 
(b) This subsection applies to all Utah 
licenses originally issued, renewed, or extended 
on or after July 1, 1989. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-18 (1989): 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit 
to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle 
of a type required to be registered in this state: 
(a) which is not registered or for which a 
certificate of title has not been issued or 
applied for; or 
(b) for which the appropriate fee has not been 
paid as required unless allowed under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) If an application accompanied by the proper 
fee has been made in this state for registration 
and certificate of title for a vehicle, it may be 
operated temporarily, pending complete 
registration, by displaying a valid temporary 
permit or other evidence of the application under 
rules made by the commission. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : Case No. 890524-CA 
v. : 
EILEEN 0. BOOTH : Category No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 30, 1989, police officers stopped defendant while 
she was driving her vehicle without a Utah driver's license and 
for no Utah vehicle registration. (T.13) Officer Manning asked 
to she her vehicle registration and a driver's license. (T.14) 
Defendant's vehicle had Oregon plates and an investigator knew 
the defendant had no Utah driver's license. (T.ll) Earlier, 
Officer Manning had "seen the vehicle on the streets and within 
the home address" of the defendant and knew then that defendant 
had no Utah driver's license or registration. (T.ll,12) 
Defendant was cited for having no Utah registration and no Utah 
driver's license and her van was impounded. (R:l) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State complied with defendant's general request for 
discovery in compliance with State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1987) and Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16 (1953, as amended). 
Defendant fails to show how the testimony of the "surprise 
- 1 -
witness" resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant a reversal 
under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30(a). The trial court's factual 
evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, 
since the trial judge is in the best position to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. Finally, Utah Code Ann. 
§§41-2-104 (driving without a license) and 41-1-18 (driving an 
unregistered vehicle) are not unconstitutional as applied to 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO PRODUCE 
REQUESTED INFORMATION DURING DISCOVERY DID NOT 
RESULT IN PREJUDICE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVERSAL 
UNDER RULE 30. 
Defendant argues that the State failed to comply with a 
full discovery request and called a surprise witness. The 
prosecution denied defendant's general request for discovery in 
accordance with State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) and, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16, the State sent defendant 
the information with the list of the State's witnesses. The 
information listed Officer Manning but did not mention Officer 
Jorgensen who was called to testify at the hearing. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(g), Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-16(g), grants a trial court ample discretion to remedy 
any prejudice to a party resulting from a breach of the 
discovery rules. Knight, 734 at 918. The defendant in this 
case failed to request a continuance at the point when 
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Officer Jorgensen was called to the stand. By not requesting a 
continuance at that point, the defendant "essentially waived 
[her] right to later claim error." State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 
415, 418 (Utah 1989); See generally Utah R.Evid. 103(a); State 
v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
Further, an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in 
denying this relief occurs only when "the prejudice to the 
defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error set 
forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures requested but 
refused would have obviated this prejudice." Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 918. Thus, in order for the State's failure to produce the 
requested information to result in prejudice sufficient to 
warrant reversal, Rule 30 requirements must be met. 
[T]he Rule 30 phrase "affect the substantial 
rights of a party" means that an error warrants 
reversal "only if a review of the record persuades 
the court that without the error there was 'a. 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
for the defendant.'" 
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (emphasis in 
original)). Thus, "for an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." Grueber, 776 P. 2d at 76 
(quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 920). 
The Court in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 276 (Utah 
1985) found no "reasonable probability" that undisclosed 
evidence would have affected the outcome when the defendant did 
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not describe how the evidence could have affected the verdict. 
Likewise, the defendant in this case gives no basis for 
concluding that the outcome of her case would be different if 
she had known that Officer Jorgensen would testify, 
"this leaves the reviewing court to speculate 
whether, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the defense would have adduced 
other evidence which, when considered in light of 
the evidence actually presented, would have 
produced a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt." 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 921-22. 
In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985), the 
Court ruled that other evidence was sufficient to show the 
defendant was connected with the crime, the prosecution "did 
not so mislead the defendant as to cause prejudicial error." 
Here, the testimony given by Officer Manning was 
sufficient to prove that the defendant had no Utah driver's 
license or Utah vehicle registration. Therefore, the 
likelihood of a different outcome if defendant had known of 
Officer Jorgensen's testimony is not sufficiently high. 
Also, in State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) 
surprise testimony was held to be without prejudicial effect 
since the defendant could have easily challenged the veracity 
of the witness with his own testimony. Here, again, the 
defendant could have challenged the truth of Officer 
Jorgensen's testimony about her employment, residence, and 
prior applications for a driver's license with her own 
testimony. The probability of a different verdict in this case 
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does not undermine confidence in the outcome so no reversible 
error has occurred. 
Furthermore, a review of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(c), 
indicates what items of evidence are discoverable without the 
necessity of a hearing. Defendant had requested M6. A list of 
witnesses and a brief summary of their expected testimony." 
(R.9) Since the State denied or refused to give her that 
information, her remedy under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(5) was 
to move the court for an order prior to the trial to require 
the State to comply with her request. By failing to obtain 
such an order, she waived her right to that information. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT OFFICER MANNING HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOPPING THE APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Officer Manning acted in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-15 (1982), which provides the following: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
An investigatory stop falls short of an official arrest but the 
peace officer "must point to specific articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude [the suspect] had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
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In State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
court held that "a stop of a vehicle for lack of registration 
does not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment if there is at least an 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is not 
registered." Further, "[t]he police not only had a right to 
make the stop, they had a duty to do so." Xd. In Cole, the 
court found probable cause to stop the vehicle the defendant 
was driving since there was no visible registration plates. 
Id. The vehicle was also property impounded pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §41-1-115. 
In the present case, Officer Manning could articulate a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant's vehicle was not 
registered. He could see no signs of registration or Utah 
plates. (T.11,12) He stated he had seen the vehicle before and 
that another investigator knew the driver had no license. 
(T.ll) Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress was 
appropriately denied. 
POINT III 
UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE CODE PROVISIONS ARE CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
The question of whether the Utah motor vehicle code 
unconstitutionally interferes with defendant's right to travel 
and invades her privacy interest has been settled by recent 
cases. In City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987), 
the defendant challenged his conviction for driving without a 
license in an unregistered vehicle. The defendant in Wisden 
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argued that his status as a "free man" prevented him from being 
bound by the motor vehicle code without his consent. Id. at 
982. 
The Wisden court rejected his argument and held that "the 
right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions 
does not include the ability to ignore laws governing the use 
of public roadways." Id. at 983. In addition, "[t]he ability 
to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a 
fundamental right; it is a privilege that is granted upon the 
compliance with statutory licensing procedures and may be 
revoked." Id. 
The defendant in State v. Stevens, 718 P.2d 398 (Utah 
1986) also asserted that our state laws unconstitutionally 
impeded his fundamental and unrestricted right to travel. The 
court affirmed that "our legislature has the power and duty to 
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare of all 
citizens." id. at 399. "In furtherance of that power and duty, 
conditions and regulations for the operation of a motor vehicle 
on our public roads and highways are a proper subject for 
legislative action." Id. 
Finally, even the case, Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City 
of Chicago, 169 N.E. 22 (Illinois 1929) that appellant cites in 
support of her argument recognizes that while the legislature 
had no power to deny a citizen the right to travel, it could 
regulate that right in accordance with the public interest and 
convenience. Defendant has the constitutional right to travel 
but she does not have the Constitutional right to operate a 
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vehicle on Utah roads and highways outside the bounds of Utah 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument/ the trial court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted th is O c day of February, 1990 
DAVID E YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
>AVID S7 WALSH 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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